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COLLISION AT SEA: THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF
THE SUPERSEDING CAUSE AND PURE COM(PARATIVE
FAULT DOCTRINES IN ADMIRALTY
Kelsey L. Joyce Hooke
Abstract: Courts have long sought to develop rational methods both for limiting a
tortfeasor's liability and allocating damages among multiple tortfeasors. Courts developed the
doctrine of proximate cause to address the first concern, employing superseding cause
analysis when multiple forces produce an injury. In admiralty, the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the second concern by adopting pure comparative fault in United States v. Reliable
TransferCo. In Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., the Court endorsed the continued use of superseding
cause in admiralty cases, holding that it does not conflict with pure comparative fault. This
Comment argues that the Sofec Court's method of superseding cause analysis does indeed
conflict with pure comparative fault and should therefore be abandoned. This Comment
concludes that superseding cause, regardless of its method of analysis, does not add to the
doctrine of proximate cause and should be eliminated.

In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., the U.S. Supreme Court

adopted the pure comparative fault rule for allocating damages in
admiralty collision cases.' This method of allocation replaced the divided
damages rule,2 which required equal division of damages among all
parties whose fault contributed to the injuries? The demise of the majorminor fault rule, which exonerated a party whose fault was slight, came
with the abandonment of the divided damages rule.4
Twenty-two years after Reliable Transfer, the Court revisited
admiralty collision law in Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc.' In Sofec, the Court

held that the doctrine of superseding cause had survived Reliable
Transfer.6 Superseding cause allows a tortfeasor to escape liability where
the court finds that a subsequent act broke the causal chain between the
prior act and the ultimate harm.7 As used by the Sofec Court, superseding

1. 421 U.S. 397,411 (1975).
2. Id. at410-11.
3. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854).
4. Reliable Transfer,421 U.S. at 406.
5. 517 U.S. 830 (1996). Sofec actually involved a grounding, rather than a collision. The same
principles apply to allisions, collisions, groundings, and strandings. This Comment denotes this body
of law as admiralty collision law.
6. Id. at 832.
7. Id. at 837-38.
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cause directly conflicts with pure comparative fault and marks a return to
the overruled major-minor fault rule.
Part I of this Comment describes the divided damages, major-minor
fault, and pure comparative fault rules. Part II explains the application of
proximate cause and superseding cause in admiralty. Part III discusses
the three methods for analyzing superseding cause-the foreseeability,
remoteness, and culpability methods-and how the culpability method,
which was used in Sofec, conflicts with comparative fault and marks a
return to the major-minor fault rule. Part IV explains how the Sofec
Court could have reached the same result without creating the conflict by
using traditional proximate cause notions. Part V argues that the
foreseeability and remoteness methods of superseding cause analysis add
nothing to proximate cause doctrine. This Comment then urges courts to
discontinue the use of superseding cause, regardless of the method of
analysis, in the admiralty context.
I.

ALLOCATION OF DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY

A.

DividedDamages

Before 1975, American courts sitting in admiralty allocated damages
in collision cases according to the "divided damages" or "moieties" rule.'
American jurisprudence inherited the rule from England,9 although no
American decision mentioned it until 1836,10 and the U.S. Supreme
Court did not expressly adopt it until 1854." The rule initially applied
only to collisions between two vessels, 2 but courts soon extended it to
collisions involving three or more vessels, 3 and to allisions, 4 groundings, 5
and strandings.16
8. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 410-11. This Comment uses only the term "divided damages" to
describe this rule of law.
9. Id. at 402. The first record of the use of the divided damages rule in English law appears in
William Welwod, An Abridgment ofAll Sea-Lawes 45-46 (London, Humphrey Lownes 1613). It
can be traced at least as far back as the twelfth century and the Laws of Oleron. Dennis A. Goschka,
Goodbye to All That/-The UnlamentedDemise ofthe DividedDamages Rule, 8 J. Mar. L. & Com.
51, 58 (1976).
10. See Ralston v. The States Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1836) (No. 11,540).
11. See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., The Alabama & The Game-cock, 92 U.S. 695, 696 (1875).
14. See, e.g., Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874). For a definition of allision, see
infra note 17.

Fault in Admiralty
Where more than one party was at fault for a collision, 7 the divided
damages rule required that damages be divided among them equally."
Hence, in a collision involving two vessels, both of which are at fault, the
court added the vessels' combined damages and divided by two. It then
awarded the vessel suffering greater damages a decree in the amount of
the difference between her damages and half the total damages,
regardless of the relative fault of the parties.' 9 Thus, for example, a vessel
only ten percent at fault for the collision would still be responsible for up
to fifty percent of the damages.2"
B.

Major-MinorFault

Courts created the major-minor fault rule to avoid the harsh results
mandated by the divided damages rule.2 The rule did not replace the
divided damages rule, but rather provided a means of circumventing it in
some cases.' Originally, the rule was evidentiary in nature and operated
as a presumption in favor of the party whose fault was minor:
[W]here one vessel clearly shown to have been guilty of a fault,
adequate in itself to account for the collision, seeks to impugn the
management of the other vessel, there is a presumption in favor of

15. See, e.g., White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341
(1922). Traditionally, a grounding occurred when a vessel ran into the bottom, while a stranding
occurred when a vessel ran into the beach. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 316, 675-76 (1974).
Today, the tehns are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397,400 n.1 (1975) (referring to stranding as grounding).
16. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 400 n.1 (recognizing long-settled principle that divided
damages rule applies to cases like Reliable Transfer,which involved stranding).
17. Technically, a "collision" involves two (or more) vessels. An "allision" occurs between a
vessel and an object other than a vessel. Black's Law Dictionary 28, 109 (Pocket ed. 1996). In this
Comment, when used without reference to a specific allision or collision, the term "collision"
encompasses both types of accidents.
18. The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854).
19. See, e.g., National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950)
(expressing that although appropriate proportion of damages would be approximately five to one,
divided damages rule required equal division).
20. The vessel's portion would be less than 50% if there were more than two responsible parties.
For example, where three parties were at fault for the collision, each vessel would pay one-third of
the damages.
21. The major-minor fault rule was established in The City ofNew York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893).
22. See, e.g., The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404,409 (1896).
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the latter, which can only be rebutted by clear proof of a
contributing fault.23
However, the life of the major-minor fault doctrine as a procedural rule
was short-lived.
Three years after its inception, the major-minor fault rule changed
from an evidentiary burden of proof rule to a substantive rule exculpating
the party whose fault was minor. 4 The rule, in its revised form, excused
the slight fault of one party where the other party's fault was very great.25
Exemplificative cases include The Columbian26 and Villain & Fassio E
Compagnia v. T/S E.W. Sinclair.27
In The Columbian, the ocean steamer, The Columbian, collided with
the fishing schooner, Ella M. Doughty, under a shroud of fog.28 The
Columbian was traveling at a speed so excessive that the First Circuit
Court of Appeals dubbed it "without due regard for human life., 29 The
Doughty's alleged negligence was in the use of improper fog signals.3"
Finding the Columbian "guilty... of a flagrant error,"'" the appellate
court held it responsible for all the damages.32 In doing so, it overturned
the lower court's decision finding both vessels at fault, instead restricting
liability to the vessel whose negligence was extreme.33
Villain & Fassio involved a collision between a tanker, The E.W.
Sinclair, and an anchored motor vessel, The Angela Fassio. 4 The
Sinclairwas negligent in failing to navigate with caution and in traveling
at an excessive speed. As in the Columbian, the Sinclair's owners
asserted that the Angela Fassio should share liability because the Angela
Fassio sounded an arguably inappropriate signal as the Sinclair
23. The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 197 (1895).
24. The Umbria, 166 U.S. at 409. This restructuring was done by Justice Addison Brown, who
created the rule in its original form in The City of New York 147 U.S. at 85.
25. The Umbria, 166 U.S. at 409.
26. 100 F. 991, 997 (lst Cir. 1900).
27. 207 F. Supp. 700, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'dper curiam, 313 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. 100 F. at 992.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 995.
31. Id.at 997.
32. Id. at 998.
33. Id.
34. Villain & Fassio E Compagnia v. T/S E.W. Sinclair, 207 F. Supp. 700, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff'dper curiam, 313 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. Id. at710.

Fault in Admiralty
approached.3 6 The court rejected this argument, stating "[t]he gross faults
of the Sinclair so flagrantly and heavily outweigh any passive fault on
the part of the Fassiothat in this case it is particularly apt to say that the
interests of justice are best served by condemning the more culpable
vessel completely."37
C.

Discontentwith the DividedDamagesRule

As comparative negligence principles became popular in other realms
of American jurisprudence, commentators increasingly criticized
admiralty's divided damages rule.38 Courts also viewed the rule as unjust
and applied it begrudgingly.3 9 One of its harshest criticisms came from
Judge Learned Hand: "An equal division [of damages] in the case would
be plainly unjust; they ought to be divided in some proportion as five-toone. And so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient

rule which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations."4 °
Before comparative fault became popular in other American courts,

complaints about the divided damages rule were uncommon.4 Prior to
the advent of comparative fault, the affirmative defense of contributory
fault precluded recovery where a plaintiff was partly at fault for his or

her injury.42 Under the contributory fault rule, recovery was precluded
regardless of how slight the plaintiff's fault.43 Contributory fault
flourished in American courts around the trn of the century, but
subsequently fell into disfavor as overly harsh.4 The divided damages

36. Id.
37. Id. at 712 (internal quotations omitted).
38. See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law ofAdmiralty 531 (2d ed. 1975); Jack L.
Allbritton, Division ofDamagesin Admiralty-A Rising Tide of Confusion, 2 J. Mar. L. & Com. 323
(1971); Theodore K. Jackson, The Archaic Rule ofDividingDamages in Marine Collisions, 19 Ala.
L. Rev. 263 (1967); Graydon S. Staring, Contributionand Division of Damages in Admiralty and
MaritimeCases, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 304 (1957).
39. See, e.g., Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036, 1038 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd,
421 U.S. 397 (1975); Tank Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir.
1957); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1954).
40. National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405,410 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J., dissenting).
41. The doctrine of contributory fault was never adopted in admiralty collision cases. Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,408-09 (1953).
42. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts § 67, at 469 (5th ed. 1984).
43. Id.
44. Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in
North Carolina,18 Campbell L. Rev. 1, 25-29, 71-72 (1996).
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rule allowed at least partial recovery to a faulty plaintiff, whereas
contributory fault did not. In comparison, the divided damages rule
seemed much more equitable. However, as state courts replaced strict
contributory negligence rules with comparative negligence, the divided
damages rule began to stand out as a relic of a less enlightened era.
Critics also cited the desire for uniformity within admiralty as a reason
for abolishing the divided damages rule." Comparative negligence had
governed in admiralty personal injury cases since 1890.46 This general
maritime law rule was reinforced by the Jones Act, which governs
seamen's negligence suits against their employers,47 and the Death on the
High Seas Act, which provides for wrongful death suits for deaths
occurring at sea.48
The need for worldwide uniformity in admiralty collision law
provided another source of complaints.4 9 Worldwide uniformity has long
been a goal of American admiralty collision law because of the high
number of cases involving parties from two or more nations.5"
Proportionate fault had been adopted in 1910 by parties to the Brussels
Maritime Convention,"1 and the vast majority of seafaring and

45. See, e.g., Allbritton, supra note 38, at 346; Staring, supra note 38, at 340-41,343-44.
46. The Max Morris v. Curry, 137 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890).
47. Jones Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 998 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994)).
The Jones Act incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which
governs federal railroad workers. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). The comparative negligence
provision can be found in the FELA at 45 U.S.C. § 53.
48. Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. app. § 766 (1994)).
49. David R. Owen and M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr., Fifteen Years Under Reliable Transfer: 19751990 Developments in American MaritimeLaw in Light of the Rule of ComparativeFault, 22 J. Mar.
L. & Com. 445, 446 (1991).
50. See, e.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871) ("Undoubtedly, no single nation can
change the law of the sea. That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations
can create obligations for the world."); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953)
("[Clourts of this and other commercial nations have generally deferred to a non-national or
international maritime law of impressive maturity and universality."); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas.
418 (D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). In De Lovio, Justice Story sets forth a long discussion of the
ancient origins of maritime law, characterizes it as international rather than the law of any one
nation, and relies on laws from several nations in determining the appropriate jurisdictional test for
contract cases.
51. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules With Respect to Collision
Between Vessels, Sept. 23, 1910, art. 4, in 6 Benedict on Admiralty, at 3-11 (7th rev. ed. 1993)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention]. The United States is not a party to this Convention.

Fault in Admiralty
commercial nations subsequently adopted proportionate fault.52 Thus, the
United States's adherence to the divided damages rule was clearly
inconsistent with the laws of other seafaring nations and promoted
worldwide forum-shopping. 3
D.

Reliable Transfer: The Abolition ofDividedDamages

The U.S. Supreme Court finally responded to these criticisms in 1975
by sinking the divided damages rule in UnitedStates v. Reliable Transfer
Co. 54 In Reliable Transfer, the trial court begrudgingly divided the
damages equally.55 The appellate court upheld the decision,56 and the
Supreme Court granted review on the "single question whether the
admiralty rule of equally divided damages should be replaced by the rule
of damages in proportion to fault. ' 5 7 It concluded that it should.5"
Reliable Transfer concerned the stranding of The Mary A. Whalen, a
coastal tanker, outside New York Harbor. 59 Reliable Transfer Co., the
Whalen's owners, sued the United States, alleging that the Coast Guard
was negligent in failing to maintain a breakwater light.' The Whalen was
proceeding through a narrow inlet bounded by a breakwater on one side
and Coney Island on the other.6 The light normally marked the
breakwater, but the light was not operating on the night of the
stranding.s2 Believing the vessel had already passed the breakwater, the
Whalen's captain turned the vessel towards it. 3 Despite the abundance of
navigational equipment available on the Whalen, the captain used only
his own "guesswork" in making this fateful decision. Within a few

52. John F. Meadows & George J. Markulis, Apportioning Fault in Collision Cases, 1 U.S.F.
Mar. L.J 1, 24 (1989); David R. Owen, The Originsand Development ofMarine Collision Law, 51
Tul. L. Rev. 759,795-98 (1977).
53. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,403-04 (1975).
54. Id at411.
55. Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1757, 1764-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd,421 U.S. 397 (1975).
56. Reliable Transfer,497 F.2d at 1038.
57. Reliable Transfer,421 U.S. at 401 n.2.
58. Id at410-11.
59. Id at 398.
60. Id. at 399. The Supreme Court adopted the district court's account of the facts.
61. Id. at 398.
62. Id
63. Id. at 398-99.
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minutes, the Whalen was stranded.' Calling the Whalen's error
"egregious," the district court found that the stranding was caused
seventy-five percent by the Whalen's negligent navigation and twenty65
five percent by the Coast Guard's failure to maintain the light.
Following the divided damages rule, the district court divided the
damages equally despite its seventy-five/twenty-five percent fault
allocation.'
In overruling the divided damages rule, the unanimous Supreme Court
spared no harsh words. The Court opined that in almost every case, the
divided damages rule "produce[d] palpably unfair results." 67 The Court
acknowledged the numerous criticisms of the rule, 68 and agreed that it
was "crude," "inequitable," and "archaic. 6 9
The major-minor fault rule went down with the divided damages rule.
The Reliable Transfer Court characterized the major-minor fault rule as
an "escape valve" to the divided damages rule. 7' The major-minor fault
rule, "in addition to being inherently unreliable, simply replaces one
unfairness with another."' The Court further explained that the mere fact
that "a vessel is primarily negligent does not justify its shouldering all
responsibility, nor excuse the slightly negligent vessel from bearing any
liability at all., 72 The two courts of appeals that have addressed the
major-minor fault rule since Reliable Transfer have interpreted this
language as abolishing it.73 Under any interpretation, the Court
undeniably disapproved of it.
E.

ComparativeFault

The replacement for the divided damages rule was pure comparative
fault.74 The Reliable Transfer Court noted the justifications for
64. Id. at 399.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 399-400.
67. Id. at 405.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 406.
Id.

72. Id.

73. Western Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984); Getty
Oil Co. v. SS Ponce De Leon, 555 F.2d 328, 333 (2d Cir. 1977).
74. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.

Fault in Admiralty
proportionate fault, citing the viability of comparative fault in maritime
personal injury cases and foreign collision cases. 75 In adopting
comparative fault, the Court stated: "We hold that when two or more
parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a

maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damages is to be
allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of

their fault .

.76 The lower court thus adopted comparative fault for

admiralty collision cases, eliminating the antiquated divided damages
rule and bringing American courts in line with other seafaring nations.
Comparative fault exists in two basic forms: pure and modified." The
Reliable Transfer Court adopted pure comparative fault, which is most
easily explained by contrasting it with modified comparative fault. Pure
comparative fault requires the allocation of damages among all parties
whose fault contributed to the damages in proportion to their
comparative fault. 7 This is true regardless of the magnitude of each
party's fault.79 Thus, in theory, one party could be found one percent at
fault, with ninety-nine percent of the fault attributable to another party.
The court would divide damages accordingly, with one party
contributing one percent and the other paying ninety-nine percent. This
absolute mandate that damages be divided is the distinguishing factor
between pure and modified comparative fault. Under modified
comparative fault, a plaintiff whose proportion of fault exceeds a certain

percentage will not recover."0 Most American jurisdictions have adopted

75. Reliable Transfer,421 U.S. at 407.
76. Ic at 411. The Reliable Transfer Court used the terms "comparative negligence,"
"comparative fault," and "proportional fault' interchangeably. This has led to great confusion and
discussion among courts and commentators as to whether damages are to be allocated based on
causation or degree of culpability. The language of Reliable Transfer lends support to both methods.
This is an intriguing issue, but is beyond the scope of this Comment. The courts and commentators
are solidly split Compare Owen & Whitman, supra note 49, at 476-83 (arguing that causation is
appropriate method), with Meadows & Markulis, supra note 52, at 39-41 (arguing that culpability is
better method). The conflict between superseding cause and comparative fault exists under either
method of allocation.
77. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 67, at 471-74; 3 Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of
Torts § 13.7, at 714-15 (1986).
78. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 67, at 472; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 13.8, at 716-18
(1986), 114 (Supp. 1998).
79. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 67, at 472; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 13.8, at 716-18
(1986), 114 (Supp. 1998).
80. Keeton et al., supranote 42, § 67, at 473; Speiser et al., supra note 77, §§ 13.9-.10, at 722-34
(1986), 114-15 (Supp. 1998).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:159, 1999

modified comparative fault, cutting off the ability to recover of a plaintiff
whose proportion of fault either meets or exceeds fifty percent. 8'
II.

CAUSATION IN ADMIRALTY

A.

ProximateCause

The doctrine of proximate cause is one of several legal tools that
courts use to limit the liability of a negligent actor.82 Although labeled a
causation requirement, proximate cause reflects strong considerations of
social policy. 3 Whether phrased in terms of causation, limited duty,84 or
limitations on damages,85 the analysis serves the same purpose: to
provide a rational basis for limiting liability without seriously
undermining tort law's goals of compensating the victim, forcing the
tortfeasor to internalize costs, and optimizing accident avoidance.86 This
challenging purpose has made proximate cause a somewhat nebulous
concept,87 and judges have become astute at phrasing policy judgments in
terms of causation.88 In doing so, they have broken the proximate cause
requirement into two general elements: cause-in-fact and legal cause.89
A negligent act or omission is a cause-in-fact in two situations. First,
if the harm would not have occurred but for the act, the act was a causein-fact. 90 Second, where two negligent acts, each alone sufficient to cause

81. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 67, at 473; Speiser et al., supra note 77, §§ 13.9-. 10, at 722-34
(1986), 114-15 (Supp. 1998).
82. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 264; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.1, at 383-84
(1986).
83. Keeton et al., supranote 42, § 41, at 264; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.1, at 380 (1986).
84. See, e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-99 (N.Y. 1928) (using
analysis similar to privity to limit duty owed to one class of plaintiffs).
85. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (disallowing
compensation for purely economic loss unaccompanied by bodily injury or property damage and
proclaiming that "[t]he law does not extend its protection so far").
86. Keeton et al., supra note 42, §41, at 264; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.1, at 378-80
(1986).
87. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 263-64; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.1, at 378-79
(1986).
88. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 264.
89. Id. at 264, 272-73. Courts and commentators frequently use the term "proximate cause" to
denote only what this Comment terms "legal cause."
90. Id. at 266; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.2, at 387 (1986), 72-73 (Supp. 1998).

Fault in Admiralty
the harm, concurrently cause the resulting harm, each will be considered
a cause-in-fact. 9

A cause-in-fact is not a proximate cause unless it is also a legal
cause.92 Courts generally determine legal cause by using the concepts of
remoteness and foreseeability.93 The determination necessarily involves
policy judgments regarding the extent to which a court will hold a
tortfeasor liable for all consequences logically traceable to the tortious
conduct.94 Admiralty courts have used these concepts in evaluating
causation for over 100 years, 9 and continue to do so today.96 Negligent
actors are responsible for all the "natural" and "probable" consequences
of their actions. 97 A court will rule out liability for remote or
unforeseeable results.9"

B.

Superseding Cause

Superseding cause is a proximate cause doctrine implicated where two
or more faults, each a cause-in-fact, combine to cause injury.' Courts
use the doctrine to cut off the liability of the first negligent actor, placing

sole responsibility on a subsequent negligent actor."' An intervening
91. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 266-67; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.2, at 387
(1986), 72-73 (Supp. 1998).
92. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 42, at 272-73; Speiser et al., supranote 77, § 11.1, at 380-83
(1986).
93. Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933) ("[l]njury at least in some form ought to
have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.'); see also Transamerica Premier Ins.
v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring that harm be reasonably foreseeable).
94. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 264; Speiser et al., supranote 77, § 11.1, at 380 (1986).
95. See, e.g., McCaffrey v. The Clara, 55 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1893).
96. See, e.g., TransamericaPremier, 107 F.3d at 930; Horn v. B.A.S.., 92 F.3d 609, 612 (8th
Cir. 1996).
97. The Joseph B. Thomas, 86 F. 658, 665 (9th Cir. 1898).
98. Id.
99. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 440-42, at 465-68 (1965); Keeton et al.,
supra note 42,
§ 44, at 301-02; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.9, at 413-20 (1986). Two or more causes-in-fact
that combine to cause an injury are termed "concurrent causes." Keeton, et al., supra note 42, § 44,
at 302 n.6.
100. Courts and commentators have used a variety of terms to describe what is termed here as
"superseding cause." See, e.g., Jones v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 977
F.2d 1106, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992) ("supervening cause"); Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765
F.2d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 1985) ("intervening negligence"); Bludworth Shipyard, Inc. v. Lira, 700
F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) ("intervening cause"). The terms used in this Comment appear to be
the most common and accurate descriptors. The Restatement also consistently uses "superseding
cause" as used here. Restatement,supra note 99, §§ 440-42, at 465-68.
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cause is any causal act that occurs after the original actor's negligent
act.' ' An intervening act is not necessarily superseding; frequently,
courts will hold both actors liable for the resultant harm. °2 The
intervening act supersedes the first actor's liability only if the court
determines that the second act broke the causal connection between the
first action and the result.0 3 Generally, the more unusual or outlandish
the later act, the more likely the court will deem it superseding."°
Consider the following example. Vessel A negligently collides with
Vessel B, causing her to sink. 5 Vessel B negligently fails to mark the
wreck. Vessel C allides with the wreck of Vessel B and is damaged. The
owner of Vessel C sues both Vessel A and the owner of Vessel B.'0 6 In
this example, the negligent (in)actions of both Vessel A and Vessel B are
causes-in-fact of the damage to Vessel C. Vessel B's negligent act
followed Vessel A's negligent act, and is thus an intervening cause of the
damage to Vessel C. If the court considers Vessel B's negligent act to be
particularly extreme or unusual," 7 Vessel B's act is a superseding cause
of the damage to Vessel C. Vessel A's act would therefore not be a
proximate cause of Vessel C's damages, and neither Vessel A nor her
owner is liable for the damage to Vessel C.' 8
101. Restatement, supra note 99, § 441, at 465-67; Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 44, at 301;
Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.9, at 413, 417 (1986). Prosser and Keeton do not use the same
terminology as the Restatement. What is labeled "superseding cause" in the Restatement and in this
Comment is frequently, although not always, termed "intervening cause" by Prosser and Keeton.
Prosser and Keeton acknowledge the existence of several terms, but do not specifically adopt any.
Beyond the difference in terminology, Prosser and Keeton's hombook explains the doctrine in
accord with the explanation given here and is a helpful reference.
102. See, e.g., examples listed in Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 44, at 303-04.
103. Restatement, supra note 99, § 440, at 465; Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 44, at 301-03;
Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.9, at 416 (1986). The various methods for determining when a
cause is superseding are analyzed below. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text
104. See infra note 115 (listing factors for determining when cause is superseding); see also
Keeton et al., supranote 42, § 44, at 301-19 (discussing factors and giving examples); Speiser et al.,
supra note 77, § 11.9, at 420 n.73 (1986) (listing Restatement factors).
105. In admiralty, a crew's negligent actions are attributed to the vessel in an in rem action. See
Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224 (1945) and cites therein.
106. Note that Vessel C's owner has the option of proceeding in personam against the negligent
individuals or in rem against the vessels themselves. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule C. This example is
primarily worded as if in rem actions were brought, except that it seems inappropriate to bring an in
rem action against sunken Vessel B, whose value may be quite minimal.
107. Again, this depends on which of the many methods the court is using to determine whether a
cause is superseding.
108. For the result in this example, see Red Star Towing & TransportationCo. v. Woodburn, 18
F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding that failure to mark wreck was superseding cause). But see

Fault in Admiralty
In the early days of the superseding cause doctrine, admiralty courts
primarily used a foreseeability test to determine whether an intervening
cause superseded the original actor's liability." 9 In Cleary Brothers v.
Port Reading Railroad, a string of barges drifted from their moorings,
were captured, and then set adrift again by the independent act of a third
party."' The Second Circuit held that the original negligent actor should
not be liable unless the third party's conduct was foreseeable."' The
Second Circuit further developed the foreseeability test in Standard Oil
Co. v. Glendola Steamship Corp., explaining that it was the "probability
of the occurrence of the wrong which count[ed], not the fact that it [was]
a wrong."" 2
Later cases expanded on the foreseeability test, citing other reasons
for deeming an intervening cause "superseding." Courts have held that,
regardless of foreseeability, an intervening cause will not cut off the first
wrongdoer's liability if the resultant risk of harm was similar to that
created by the first wrongful act."' Courts have also refused to hold the
first actor liable where the second actor was extremely negligent."4
In tort law, including land-based torts, courts have considered
numerous factors in determining whether a second-in-time cause-in-fact
was superseding. In addition to those recognized above, the Restatement
of Torts lists the following factors as worthy indicators: whether the
second act appears, in hindsight, to be "extraordinary;" whether it
"operated independently" of the original actor's negligence; and whether
the subsequent actor's negligence harmed the original actor."'

Nunley v. M/V Dauntless Colocotronis, 727 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that
failure to mark wreck was not superseding cause).
109. See, e.g., Cleary Bros. v. Port Reading R.R., 29 F.2d 495,498 (2d Cir. 1928).
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 496.
Id. at498.
47 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 193 1).
Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 116 (5th Cir. 1970).

114. Hansen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 33 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1929) (referring to
intervening negligence as "incredible" and "extravagant").

115. The six-factor list, in its entirety, includes:
(a)
(b)

the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the
event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the
circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
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SupersedingCause After Reliable Transfer

Lower courts disagreed about the superseding cause doctrine's
viability in the wake of Reliable Transfer. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the doctrine's tenure had ended with the divided damages
rule," 6 while the Eighth Circuit held that it had survived." 7 The Fifth
Circuit apparently agreed with the Eighth Circuit, using the superseding
cause doctrine without discussing its compatibility with Reliable
Transfer."8 In Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits in applying the superseding cause doctrine despite
the comparative fault rule."9
Courts and critics who argued that the doctrine was no longer viable
after Reliable Transfer cited two reasons. First, some concluded that
superseding cause was an ameliorative doctrine to lessen the harsh
results of the divided damages rule and, 2 ° thus, was no longer
necessary.'' Second, they reasoned that the superseding cause doctrine
conflicted with the comparative fault doctrine.' While comparative fault

(c)

(d)
(e)

the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any
situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is
not a normal result of such a situation;
the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third
person's act or to his failure to act;

the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which
is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to
liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets
the intervening force in motion.
Restatement, supra note 99, § 442, at 467-68; see also Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 44, at 301-19
(presenting numerous reasons courts have deemed causes superseding, including those listed in
Restatement); Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.9, at 420 n.73 (1986) (listing Restatement factors).
116. Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 (1lth Cir. 1985).
117. Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Mays Towing Co., 927 F.2d 1453, 1459 (8th Cir. 1991).
118. Nunley v. MV Dauntless Colocotronis, 727 F.2d 455,463-66 (5th Cir. 1984).
119. 54 F.3d 570, 573-76 (9th Cir. 1995).
120. See, e.g., Hercules, 765 F.2d at 1075; Terry Christlieb, Note, Why Superseding Cause
Analysis Should Be Abandoned, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 161, 169-70 (1993). The major-minor fault rule is
an example of an ameliorative doctrine. See supra Part I.B.
121. Hercules, 765 F.2d at 1075 ("Under a 'proportional fault' system, no justification exists for
applying the doctrines of intervening negligence and last clear chance.").
122. See, e.g., Owen & Whitman, supra note 49, at 462 ("[T]he concept of [superseding] cause
remains contrary to the proportionate fault approach mandated in Reliable Transfer."); Christlieb,
supra note 120, at 181 ("It is logically inconsistent to simultaneously hold that all negligent parties
should pay in proportion to their fault, and that one negligent party does not have to pay its share.").
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requires the division of damages among all parties whose negligence
caused the harm," the superseding cause doctrine eliminated one or
more causes-in-fact from the allocation. 4 Thus, some concluded, the
doctrines were irreconcilable.l12
Those maintaining that superseding cause survived simply did not see
a conflict. 126 The Eighth Circuit rejected the conclusion of the Eleventh
Circuit, stating:
To the extent that Hercules [the Eleventh Circuit ruling] holds that
liability for negligence which is a cause in fact of injury-no matter
how remote-cannot be cut off, we squarely reject it as not
compelled by Reliable Transfer. Rather, we see no inconsistency
27
between comparative fault and superseding cause.
Fault, the court reasoned, was only to be allocated among parties whose
negligence proximately caused the harm. 22 Hence, not every act that was
a cause-in-fact had to be included in the allocation.
D.

Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc.: The Affirmation of Superseding Cause

The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split when it affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc. that superseding
cause survived the adoption of pure comparative fault.'2 9 The case arose
from the stranding of an oil tanker, The Exxon Houston, several hours
after it broke away from a mooring system owned and operated or
manufactured by the various respondents.' Exxon brought negligence,
products liability, and breach of warranty claims against the respondents,
alleging that they were responsible for the breakout.'
When the Houston broke away from the mooring system, part of a
hose used for delivering oil from the tanker to the system remained
123. See supraPart I.E.
124. See supraPart ll.B.
125. See supranotes 116, 120-22.
126. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 54 F.3d 570, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 830
(1996); Lone Star Indus. v. Mays Towing Co., 927 F.2d 1453, 1458-59 (8th Cir. 1991).
127. Lone StarIndus., 927 F.2d at 1459.
128. Ma
129. 517 U.S. at 836-39.
130. Id. at 832. Some of the defendants owned and/or operated the mooring system, while another
had manufactured it. Third party claims were also brought against manufacturers and suppliers of the
chain that held the tanker to the mooring system. Id. at 834.
131. IM
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attached to the vessel, threatening the Houston's maneuverability.' 32
Roughly one half hour after the breakout, an assist vessel gained control
of the hose, eliminating the threat.'33 The Houston then turned away from
the shallow water and headed back out to sea. 3 4 Her captain's series of
"extraordinarily" negligent actions then began. 35 Most significantly, the
captain failed to plot the tanker's position, preventing him from effectively
navigating.'3 6 Due to his subsequent navigational errors, the Houston's
crew turned her back toward shore and eventually stranded her.'37
The district court found that the Houston's "extraordinary negligence"
superseded any fault of the parties responsible for the breakout,'38 and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.'39 Exxon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the concepts of proximate cause and superseding cause should not be
4
used in a pure comparative fault system. 1
The Supreme Court firmly rejected Exxon's arguments, holding that
proximate cause analysis was required and that superseding cause
analysis could be used within a comparative fault system."4 The Court
explained that fault was to be apportioned only among parties whose
fault proximately caused the harm and that superseding cause was a
viable way of determining whether a cause-in-fact was a proximate

cause. 142
In determining that the Houston's negligence superseded any fault of
the prior actors, the Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and district courts all
placed great weight on the egregiousness of her captain's errors.
Although foreseeability is mentioned in the circuit and Supreme Court
decisions," they apparently determined that the Houston's acts were
superseding because they were extremely negligent, repeatedly labeling

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
Exxon

Id. at 833.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 833-34.
Id.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 836-38, 842.
Id. at 837-38.
Id. (quoting 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and MaritimeLaw § 5-3, at 165-66 (2d ed. 1994));
Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 54 F.3d 570, 578 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd,517 U.S. 830.
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the conduct of the Houston's crew as "extraordinarily negligent." 1" In
explaining the doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that an intervening cause

may cut off a prior actor's liability where it "is the result of extraordinary
negligence."' 4
E.

Superseding CauseAfter Sofec

Only one reported admiralty case since Sofec includes a substantial
superseding cause analysis.' In Crounse Corp. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 47 the third-party defendant urged the court to find that a second
wrongdoer's act superseded the first actor's negligence. 48 The court
undertook an extensive discussion of superseding cause, citing all the
indicative factors laid out in the Restatement. 49 The court ultimately
found that 5the
second act was foreseeable and, therefore, not
0
superseding.
The Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's superseding cause argument
in an unpublished case, Fox v. United States.' In Fox, one defendant
sought indemnification from another, claiming that the second
defendant's act superseded his negligent omission.'52 The court rejected
his argument, stating that the second defendant's "negligence was not so
extraordinary as to extinguish [the first defendant's] own liability."'5
The court distinguished the second defendant's conduct from that of the

144. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 834-36, 840.
145. Sofec, 54 F.3d at 575.
146. Other admiralty cases have mentioned superseding cause, but have not discussed it. In
H.R.M., Inc. v. S/V Venture VII, the court found a subsequent act superseding, but did not explain its
reasoning. 972 F. Supp. 92, 99-100 (D.R.L 1997). In a Ninth Circuit case, Sementilli v. Trinidad
Corp., the majority opinion does not mention superseding cause, but is discussed in the special
concurrence. No. 96-16034, 1998 WL 784675 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1998, amended Nov. 12, 1998).
Judge Nelson's concurrence indicates that an actor is not liable when the "injury is brought about by
a later cause of independent origin over which the defendant has no control or responsibility." Id. at
*12 (Nelson, J., concurring). Judge Nelson concluded that general sea conditions and an upsidedown rug are "insufficient intervening causes to relieve [the defendant] of liability" in a slip and fall
case. Id. at *12-13 (Nelson, J., concurring).
147. 956 F. Supp. 1392 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
148. Id. at 1395.
149. Id. at 1395-1401.
150. Id. at 1399-1400; see Restatement factors, supra note 115.
151. No. 97-15417, 1998 WL 482959, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1998).
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id. at *3.
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second actors in Sofec and Hunley v. Ace Maritime Corp.'54 In both Sofec
and Hunley, the second actor's conduct was grossly negligent.'55
A Fifth Circuit court also addressed superseding cause after Sofec in
another unpublished decision, Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco
International, Inc.'56 One defendant moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the action of the plaintiff and another defendant were
superseding causes.'57 The court denied the motion but upheld the
validity of the argument. 8 The court set forth three ways in which it
could find an intervening cause to be superseding. First, if the initial
actor should have realized the second actor might act as he did, the first
actor will be held liable.'59 Second, if a reasonable person under similar
circumstances would not have considered the intervening action
extraordinary, the first actor's liability will not be cut off. Lastly, the first
actor will be held liable where "the intervening act is a normal
consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent."'
III. THE SOFECSUPERSEDING CAUSE ANALYSIS CONFLICTS
WITH PURE COMPARATIVE FAULT
Sofec fell far short of helping the doctrine of proximate cause become
a viable and understandable method of limiting liability without
undermining the goals of tort law. Instead, the Sofec Court endorsed a
rule that is irreconcilable with pure comparative fault and endorsed the
useless and confusing doctrine of superseding cause. The Sofec Court
correctly concluded that the doctrines of proximate cause and
superseding cause do not inherently conflict with comparative fault.
However, superseding cause as used by the Court does conflict with pure
comparative fault.
The various methods for determining whether a cause is superseding
can be separated into two classes: those based on culpability and those
154. Id.; Hunley v. Ace Maritime Corp., 927 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1991).
155. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 54 F.3d 570, 578-79 (9th Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 830 (1996);
Hunley, 927 F.2d at 497.
156. No. CIV.A.96-1258, 1997 WL 543108 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 1997).
157. Id. at *4.
158. Id. at *6-7.
159. Id. at *6 (citing Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir.
1992)).
160. Id.
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based on foreseeability or remoteness.' Those based on foreseeability or
remoteness do not conflict with comparative fault, but add nothing to the
doctrine of proximate cause. More significantly, however, those based on
culpability are irreconcilable with admiralty's pure comparative fault,
and their use marks a return to the long-abandoned major-minor fault
rule, which produced patently unfair results. 6 2 Hence, courts should
abolish the doctrine of superseding cause in admiralty. 63
A.

ProximateCause Does Not Inherently Conflict with
ComparativeFault

The doctrine of proximate cause does not conflict with comparative
fault. Proximate cause, although a somewhat confusing concept, is an
essential element of a negligence cause of action. With the exception of
those who advocate the absorption of proximate cause concepts into the
element of duty," no one has seriously advocated the elimination of
proximate cause. 165 At some point, the causal link between an action and
its consequences becomes too remote to consider imposing liability. 6
Under comparative fault, courts apportion damages only among those
parties whose negligence proximately caused the harm. 67 The plaintiff

161. See Christlieb, supra note 120, at 163-67, for similar classifications. His "absorbing cause"
category is similar to the "culpability" category here; his "sole proximate cause" category is similar
to the foreseeability and remoteness categories used here.
162. See supranotes 70-73 and accompanying text.
163. This argument is also applicable in any jurisdiction that follows pure comparative fault.
164. See discussion in Keeton et al., supranote 42, § 42, at 273-75.
165. Although Exxon's attorneys did make this argument in Sofec, it was in the interests of their
client and cannot be considered an objective commentary on the doctrine. Petitioner's Reply Brief
on the Merits at 2-3, Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (No. 95-129), availablein 1996
WL 84600. Exxon argued that liability should be distributed among all causes-in-fact, and that any
other distribution would be contrary to comparative fault. Thus, it urged the abandonment of
proximate cause concept. This was indeed a quite novel proposition, and one that the Court was not
likely to accept. Exxon may actually have hurt its case by making such a bold argument. Had it
merely asked for the abandonment of superseding cause, the Court may have been more inclined to
decide the case in its favor.
166. Keeton et al., supra note 42, § 41, at 264, 293-94, 312; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.1,
at 378 (1986). Also, the 'Tor Want of a Nail" story adopted from James Baldwin, where a lost
horseshoe nail eventually leads to the loss of an entire kingdom, demonstrates how attenuated the
causal chain can become. The causal chain was as follows: "For want of a nail, a shoe was lost. For
want of a shoe, a horse was lost. For want of a horse, a battle was lost. For want of a battle, a
kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail."
167. See, e.g., Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 13.22, at 754 (1986); Gardner, supra note 44, at 2.
This statement assumes, for simplicity, that negligence claims were brought against all the involved
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must prove a negligence claim, including the element of proximate
cause, against each defendant.'68 Only then is fault apportioned.'69 There
is thus no inherent incongruity between the doctrines of proximate cause
and comparative fault.
B.

The CulpabilityMethod of Superseding Cause Analysis Conflicts
with Pure ComparativeFault

Courts use many considerations in determining whether a second-intime cause-in-fact is superseding, 7 ' but those frequently used are loosely
based on three concepts: foreseeability, remoteness, and culpability. The
foreseeability and remoteness methods are based on traditional proximate
cause notions and are consistent with comparative fault. The culpability
method, however, hinges on the parties' relative degrees of blame and
directly conflicts with pure comparative fault.
1.

ForeseeabilityMethod

If the intervening cause-in-fact was unforeseeable, courts will not hold
the prior actor liable. 7 ' Courts have asked the foreseeability question,
both in superseding cause and straightforward proximate cause analysis,
in three ways: (1) whether the resultant harm was foreseeable,'
(2) whether the manner in which the harm came about was foreseeable,' 73
and (3) whether the plaintiff was foreseeable. 74 If any of these questions
is answered affirmatively, the court is likely to hold the original
parties. However, the "fault" could also be from different causes of action, for example, breach of
contract or strict products liability.
168. Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 13.22, at 754 (1986); Gardner, supra note 44, at 3.
169. Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 13.22, at 754 (1986); Gardner, supra note 44, at 3.
170. See supraPart fl.B.
171. See supranotes 109-12 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. [Wagon Mound!], 1 E.R. 404,
407 (U.K. 1963) (considering foreseeability of harm rather than of person injured or of manner in
which harm was inflicted).
173. See, e.g., Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1149-50 (N.Y. 1978)
(finding no liability because manner in which plaintiff was injured was not foreseeable).
174. If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at
least to outward seeming, with reference to [plaintiff], did not take to itself the quality of a tort
because it happened to be a wrong, although apparently not one involving the risk of bodily
insecurity, with reference to some one else.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). Note that this discussion is in the
context of duty, not causation.
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tortfeasor liable.175 In addition to the straight foreseeability test,
considerations of whether the resultant harm was different in kind or type
fall into the foreseeability category. Most early admiralty superseding
cause cases relied on foreseeability, 76 as did the post-Sofec case of
Crounse Corp. v. Vulcan Materials Co.'77 This Comment refers to this type
of superseding cause analysis as the foreseeability method.
2.

Remoteness Method

Where the link between the first cause and the resulting harm is
tenuous, courts will not hold the prior actor liable.' Considerations of
whether the second wrongdoer acted independently are within this
classification,'7 9 as are factors such as whether the intervening cause was
precipitated by a third actor or by a natural, non-human event.' The
consideration of these factors is based on the belief that courts should not
impose liability on negligent actors for remote, unnatural, or improbable
consequences of their acts.' This Comment refers to this type of
analysis as the remoteness method.
Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co. demonstrates the use of remoteness
in evaluating proximate cause.' In Kinsman, the defendants' negligence
caused a bridge to collapse.'
The collapse prevented a vessel from
unloading her cargo beyond the bridge, causing the vessel's owner to
suffer economic damages.' The court reasoned that the vessel owner's
damages were not "direct or immediate."'8 5 It concluded that "the
connection between the defendants' negligence and the claimants'
175. Keeton et al., supra note 42, §§ 41-42, at 263-73; Speiser et al., supra note 77, § 11.3, at
388-93 (1986), 73-74 (Supp. 1998).
176. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Glendola S.S. Corp. [The Glendola], 47 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir.
1931), discussed supra in text accompanying note 112; Cleary Bros. v. Port Reading R.R., 29 F.2d
495, 498 (2d Cir. 1928).
.177. 956 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
178. See, e.g., Skibs A/S Gylfe v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 438 F.2d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1971)
(indicating that remoteness is one basis for deeming cause superseding); see also De Los Santos v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480,490 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 934 (1980).
179. See, e.g., Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1992).
180. Id.
181. De Los Santos, 598 F.2d at 490; Skibs, 438 F.2d at 808.
182.
183.
184.
185.

388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 823-24.
Id.
Id. at 823.
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damages is too tenuous and remote to permit recovery." ' 6 The
remoteness method of determining superseding cause uses precisely this
reasoning. If the intervening act renders the link between the first act and
the harm tenuous, it will supersede the first actor's liability.
The remoteness and foreseeability categories of superseding cause
analysis are based on traditional notions of proximate cause and do not
conflict with comparative fault. Courts have long concluded that a
negligent actor will not be held liable if the resulting harm was
unforeseeable or too remote." 7 The only difference between this general
proposition of proximate cause and the doctrine of superseding cause is
the intervening actor. Under superseding cause analysis, it is the
intervening actor whose conduct was unforeseeable or who further
attenuated the causation chain.8' The superseding cause doctrine, when
using these methods of analysis, thus adds nothing to traditional notions
of proximate cause." 9 Hence, it does not conflict with comparative fault.
3.

Culpability Method

Courts adopting the culpability method of superseding cause analysis
hold that if the degree of the second actor's negligence was very high,
the prior actor's liability is cut off. 9 ' In such cases, courts frequently use
such adjectives as "extreme," "extraordinary," and "gross" when
describing the second actor's negligence.' 9' This Comment refers to this
method of analysis as the culpability method. An important distinction
must be made here. In some cases, courts conclude that a second act was
unforeseeable because it was extraordinarily negligent.'92 Such cases do

186. Id. at 825.
187. See supranotes 92-98 and accompanying text
188. See supranotes 109-12 and accompanying text
189. John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause "Defense": A Misfit in the World of
Contribution and Comparative Negligence, 22 S.I11.
U. L.L 1, 2, 7 (1997); Christlieb, supra note
120, at 183.
190. See, e.g., Nunley v. M/V Dauntless Colocotronis, 727 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir. 1984); Hansen
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 33 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1929).
191. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996); see also supra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., A.H. Robbins Co. v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 219 B.R. 710, 712 (E.D. Va.
1998) ("Most states consider ordinary negligence by a healthcare provider to be reasonably
foreseeable and thus, not an intervening or superseding cause. Generally, gross negligence or
intentional wrongdoing by the physician is required to interrupt the causal chain."); Hickert v.
Wright, 319 P.2d 152, 160 (Kan. 1957) (holding that first actors "[clertainly... could not
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not belong in this category because the deciding factor is foreseeability.

Under the culpability method, the second act is superseding simply
because the degree of culpability was high,
not because the high degree
93
of culpability rendered it unforeseeable.
There are indications that the Sofec Court may have reached its
conclusion because the degree of the Houston captain's negligence made
its negligent acts unforeseeable.'" However, a complete reading of the
case and the lower court decisions suggests that the Supreme Court based
its decision on the fact that the Houston's negligence was extreme, rather
than unforeseeable." 5 At any rate, the Court apparently approved of this
method, and certainly did not disapprove of it. Furthermore, lower courts
have subsequently interpreted Sofec as upholding the culpability

method. 196
The culpability method of determining whether a cause is superseding,
which was used in Sofec, directly conflicts with pure comparative fault.
Pure comparative fault mandates that courts apportion damages among

all faulty actors, no matter how great or small their degrees of
culpability.'97 The culpability method of determining whether a cause is
superseding exempts one or more parties from liability because another

party was much more negligent. In other words, fault will not be
reasonably have foreseen and were not bound to anticipate that [second actor] would commit an act
of gross and wanton negligence").
193. It would be easy to avoid this distinction by concluding that highly culpable acts will always
be unforeseeable. This is not always true. Consider this example: A taxi driver negligently leaves an
expensively dressed tourist alone in an area infamous for its violent crimes. The tourist is
subsequently robbed. The thief is certainly highly culpable, yet his conduct was foreseeable.
Restatement sections 447(a) and 449 suggest that a foreseeability analysis should be used to hold the
driver liable in such a situation.
194. Sofec, 517 U.S. at 837-38 (quoting Schoenbaum, supra note 143, §§ 5-3, at 165-66)
(explaining superseding cause in terms of foreseeability).
195. The courts repeatedly characterized the Houston's acts as "extremely," "extraordinarily," or
"grossly negligent." See supra note 144. In explaining the district court opinion, the Supreme Court
said that the Houston's captain's "extraordinary negligence was the superseding and sole proximate
cause of the Houston's grounding." Sofec, 517 U.S. at 835. The Ninth Circuit said that the captain's
actions "amounted to extraordinary negligence, superseding any negligence of the defendants." Id.
These references indicate that the focus was on the culpability, rather than foreseeability, of the
Houston's conduct.
196. See Fox v. United States, No. 97-15417, 1998 WL 482959, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1998)
(explaining that second actor's conduct was not superseding because it was not extraordinarily
negligent); Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco Int'l, No. CIV.A.96-1258, 1997 WL 543108, at *6 (E.D.
La. Sept. 3, 1997) (stating that one reason intervening cause may be superseding is that act was
extraordinarily negligent, regardless of whether it was normal consequence of first act).
197. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text
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apportioned where there is a large disparity in degree of culpability
among the parties.' 98 Thus stated, the conflict between the doctrines of
pure comparative fault and superseding cause as used in Sofec is clear:
one mandates that courts do not consider the degree of culpability; one
requires that they do.'
C.

Sofec's Adoption of the CulpabilityMethod Revives the MajorMinorFaultRule

Superseding cause, as used in Sofec, effectively marks a return to the
major-minor fault rule. The culpability method of superseding cause
analysis operates to cut off the liability of a slightly negligent actor when
another actor's negligence was much greater."' This is precisely what
the major-minor fault rule did, excusing the slight fault of one party at
the expense of the party whose fault was greater.2"' The Reliable
Transfer Court unceremoniously abandoned the major-minor fault
doctrine, criticizing it as inherently unfair. 0 2 The use of superseding
cause to achieve the same result is equally unfair. In upholding the use of
superseding cause to hold only the greatly negligent party liable, the
Sofec Court approved exactly what the Reliable Transfer Court had
rejected.

198. It should be noted that this conflict is inherent only under pure comparative fault, and would
present itself very rarely under modified comparative fault systems. The Sofec Court noted that at
least 44 of 46 states using comparative fault continue to use superseding cause. Sofec, 517 U.S. at
838. As previously discussed, most states use a modified comparative fault system. This method of
superseding cause analysis does not undermine modified comparative fault systems because they do
not mandate apportionment regardless of the degree of culpability. Rather, fault is only apportioned
where the plaintiff was, at most, 50% at fault. The conflict would only arise where the plaintiff has
sued two or more defendants, and a defendant who acted after the first defendant was much more
negligent than the first. This would indeed be an uncommon occurrence. Thus, while the culpability
method of determining whether a cause is superseding should be abandoned altogether, the need is
not as urgent in jurisdictions using modified comparative fault systems.
199. Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427,432 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) ("The principles of
comparative fault could be seriously diluted by utilizing the conduct of the plaintiff as an intervening
cause. The preferred approach is to judge the conduct of a plaintiff under comparative fault.");
Phillips, supra note 189, at 15 ("[T]he sole proximate cause defense is an anachronism that cannot
co-exist with modem concepts of comparative fault."); Christlieb, supra note 120, at 172 ("The court
was correct not to invoke superseding cause in the sense of absorbing cause, for as we have seen, it
is illegitimate to appeal to that doctrine after Reliable Transfer.").
200. See supranotes 190-92 and accompanying text.
201. See supranotes 24-25 and accompanying text
202. See supranotes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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The results in the major-minor fault cases, The Columbian and
Villain & Fassio,0 3 should have been different if the cases were
decided after Reliable Transfer. Analyzed under Sofec, however, the
result would be exactly as it was under the major-minor fault rule.
24
Whether the actual outcome of those cases was unfair is debatable; 0
whether inconsistency exists between the results reached under
Reliable Transfer and Sofec is not.
In both cases, one vessel negligently failed to sound appropriate fog
signals. 0 5 In both cases, a second vessel negligently navigated directly
into the first vessel.2" 6 Although all the vessels were negligent, the
second vessels' navigation was considerably more negligent than the first
vessels' failure to sound signals.20 7 As such, the courts used the majorminor fault rule to hold only the second vessels liable.0 8
The Columbia and Villain & Fassio were typical major-minor fault
cases and, as such, were impliedly criticized in Reliable Transfer."9
Reliable Transfer sought to end the "unfair" results reached under the
major-minor fault rule. After Reliable Transfer, the slight negligence of
the first vessels would not have been excused because the rule allowing
such exculpation was struck down. According to the reasoning of
have shared responsibility
Reliable Transfer, all the vessels should
2 10
according to their respective negligence.
Using the superseding cause analysis in Sofec, The Columbian and
Villain & Fassio outcomes would remain the same as they were under
the abrogated major-minor fault rule. Under the culpability method, a
negligent act is superseding merely because it is extraordinarily
negligent.2 ' Both the Columbian and the Villain & Fassio were
extraordinarily negligent."' Thus, a court using this method would
excuse the negligence of the first vessels, those guilty of not sounding
203. See supraPart I.B.

204. It can plausibly be argued that, in those cases, the more negligent parties should have borne
the entire expense of the collisions. It can also be easily argued that each party, regardless of the
magnitude of its negligence, should have paid in proportion to its contribution to the collision.
205. See supra notes 30 and 36.
206. See supra notes 28-29 and 34-35.
207. See supra notes 31 and 37.
208. See supra notes 32 and 37.
209. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text
210. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text
211. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text
212. See supra notes 31 and 37.
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proper fog signals. Using this analysis, these cases would reach the same
"unfair" outcome that was reached under the major-minor fault rule.
The culpability method of evaluating superseding cause is equivalent
to the major-minor fault rule. The analysis is the same; the results are the
same. The Court retired the major-minor fault rule in Reliable Transfer,
yet promulgated the culpability method of determining superseding cause
in Sofec. These results are thus inconsistent.
D.

Reliable Transfer Probably Would Have Been DecidedDifferently
Under Sofec

The outcome in Reliable Transfer itself probably would have been
different if the case had been analyzed under the superseding cause
analysis as presented in Sofec. In Reliable Transfer, the Court allocated
fault between two parties-twenty-five percent to the first negligent
actor, the Coast Guard, and seventy-five percent to the second actor, the
Whalen."1 3 The Court would probably consider the negligence of a party
that was seventy-five percent at fault to be extreme. Indeed, the Court's
description of negligent navigation by the Whalen is very similar to its
later description of the Houston's navigation.2" 4 If deemed extremely
negligent, the Whalen's conduct would have superseded the Coast
Guard's liability under the culpability method of analyzing superseding
cause. Using this analysis, the Whalen would have been solely liable for
the damages incurred in the stranding.
IV. THE SOFEC COURT COULD HAVE REACHED THE SAME
RESULT WITHOUT CREATING A DOCTRINAL CONFLICT
The Court's view that Exxon should be held solely at fault for the
grounding of the Houston is understandable. Exxon, the antithesis of the
sympathetic plaintiff,2 5 was attempting to use the comparative fault
system to recover for an accident that was largely its fault. Exxon knew it
would have to pay for most of the accident, but wanted to use the pure
213. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 399 (1975).
214. See supranotes 60-66 and 138-44.
215. Keep in mind that this occurred after the infamous Exxon Valdez grounding of March 24,
1989, in which millions of gallons of oil were spilled into an Alaskan sound and wreaked havoc on
the environment. Bill McAllister, Millions of Gallons of Oil Spill into Alaskan Sound, Wash. Post,
Mar. 25, 1989, at Al. See generally Art Davidson, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: The
DevastatingImpact of the Alaska Oil Spill (1990).
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comparative fault system to make others pay for its loss.2" 6 Hence, it is
not surprising that the Court decided to hold Exxon liable. What is
surprising is the Court's chosen method of doing so.
The Court could have reached the same result in Sofec without
creating the conflict between superseding cause and pure comparative
fault. The Court could have excused the Sofec defendants either by
traditional proximate cause analysis or by using either the remoteness or
foreseeability methods of analyzing superseding cause. Alternatively, the
Court could have steered clear of proximate cause entirely and limited
the Sofec defendants' liability in terms of duty or damages. This,
however, would not have been as desirable because it would not have
addressed the confusion surrounding the use of superseding cause
analysis.
Traditional proximate cause notions do not conflict with comparative
fault." 7 The remoteness and foreseeability methods of superseding cause
analysis are rooted in traditional proximate cause notions."' Thus, the
Court could have used the traditional notions of remoteness and
foreseeability in evaluating causation in Sofec. Whether termed
proximate cause or superseding cause analysis, the considerations and
results would be identical. The preferable approach would have been to
use only the label of proximate cause, avoiding the term superseding
cause and its accompanying confusion.
Using the concepts of remoteness and foreseeability, rather than
culpability, the Court could have held Exxon solely liable. Under
traditional proximate cause analysis, as long used in admiralty, courts
will not hold negligent actors liable for the unforeseeable, unnatural, or
improbable consequences of their acts.219 The chain of events following
the Houston's "breakout" was not foreseeable, and was hardly the natural
and probable consequence of the breakout. A reasonable person, at the
time of the "breakout," would not have foreseen that the Houston's
captain would fail to determine her position, then turn directly into a

216. Note that this is quite similar to Reliable Transfer where the negligent plaintiff intended to
take advantage of the divided damages rule to recover from the significantly less culpable defendant.
There, the Supreme Court rejected this attempt by rejecting the divided damages rule. See supra
Part ID.
217. See supranotes 165-69 and accompanying text

218. See supranotes 187-89 and accompanying text
219. See supranotes 92-98 and accompanying text

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:159, 1999

known reef. Furthermore, once the hose had been contained, the Houston
was no longer in danger until she turned towards shore.
The chain of events that led to the stranding was remote,
unforeseeable, and improbable. Hence, any negligence that contributed
to the "breakout" could not be considered a proximate cause of the
Houston's stranding. By using traditional notions of proximate cause, the
Court could have held Exxon solely liable without setting forth a
superseding cause doctrine that conflicts with pure comparative fault.
V.

ADMIRALTY LAW SHOULD ABANDON SUPERSEDING
CAUSE ANALYSIS

A.

Policy Mandates the Abandonment of the CulpabilityMethod of
Superseding Cause

Courts should not allow superseding cause to undermine admiralty's
pure comparative fault rule. Because pure comparative fault directly
conflicts with the culpability method of superseding cause analysis,
courts must eliminate one of the doctrines. The policy reasons that
prompted the Court to adopt pure comparative fault in Reliable Transfer
still hold true today: pure comparative fault is inherently fair, and it
provides much needed uniformity in international admiralty law.
The pure comparative fault method of allocating damages has been
recognized as "undoubtedly the fairest and most equitable system."22
" ' The system is
Each party pays in relation to its proportion of fault.22
designed so that each party pays no more and no less than the amount of
damages for which it is responsible. This fairness should not be
undermined by superseding cause, which would allow a party to escape
liability merely because its fault was slight, and force another party to
pay for damages beyond those for which it was to blame.
In addition to its fairness, pure comparative fault is necessary for
uniformity. The following example underscores the need for an
internationally uniform system for allocating damages in collision cases.
Before the Brussels Convention,222 a North Sea collision gave rise to

220. Henry Woods & Beth Deere, ComparativeFault § 1.11, at 22 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998);
see also Keeton et al., supranote 42, § 67, at 494, 508; Gardner, supra note 44, at 33-34.
221. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
222. Recall that the Brussels Convention established comparative fault for most of the seafaring
world. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
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three lawsuits; each in a different country.' One shipowner sued in
London's admiralty court, 4 cargo owners brought suit in Antwerp's
commercial court,' and the family of a seaman killed in the collision
brought suit in the Netherlands. 6 Although each court found both
vessels at fault, they apportioned damages differently.2 7 The Belgian
court apportioned damages according to fault. 8 The English court
followed the divided damages rule, splitting damages equally. 9 The
Dutch court awarded the deceased seaman's family nothing, because
where both vessels were at fault the contributory negligence rule
prevented either from recovering.Y0 The three outcomes were completely
inconsistent, and the plaintiffs' recoveries depended on the courts' choice
of law rather than on the merits of their claims. The possibility of a
collision involving international actors is indeed great, as is the potential
for irreconcilable legal remedies.
The Brussels Convention largely resolved this inconsistency,
establishing pure comparative fault as the rule in most nations." The
United States initially remained an anomaly-the seafaring nation
providing a different system of recovery than its worldwide trading
companions. With its adoption of pure comparative fault, the United
States ended this incongruity. 2
The culpability method of superseding cause analysis effectively
undermines the American system of pure comparative fault, and
subsequently, international uniformity. Although results overall will
remain fairly consistent, courts should reject any doctrine with the
potential to disrupt uniformity and promote unpredictability. The great
likelihood of lawsuits between vessels from different countries
underscores the need for uniform admiralty laws among seafaring
nations. The United States should continue to allocate fault according to

223. This story is told in Goschka, supra note 9, at 65-66, and A. Huger, The Proportional
DamageRule in Collisionsat Sea, 13 Cornell L.Q. 531, 531 (1928).
224. Goschka, supra note 9, at 65.
225. Id. at 65-66.
226. Id. at 66.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id
230. Id.
231. See supra note 51.
232. See supra note I and accompanying text
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pure comparative fault to remain consistent with most other seafaring
nations, which adopted pure comparative fault long ago.233
B.

Courts Should Abandon the Foreseeabilityand Remoteness
Methods of Superseding Cause Analysis

Although superseding cause analysis using remoteness or
foreseeability as determining factors is legally sound, courts should
nonetheless abandon it. 34 These two categories of superseding cause
analysis add nothing to general notions of proximate cause. 35 Because
their sole contribution is a bevy of confusing terminology, the removal of
these terms would simplify proximate cause analysis 36 Courts could
achieve identical results by simply concluding that the harm was
unforeseeable or remote, without adding the terms superseding,
intervening, supervening, or any of the many similar terms with their
nebulous definitions.
Another reason why courts should abandon superseding cause is its
potential to impose an additional, difficult burden on the plaintiff.23 7 In
most of the cases analyzed in this Comment, the plaintiffs performed the
intervening negligent acts. However, this will not always be the case.
The defendant may allege that a third party's negligence was a
superseding cause 38 If the third party is not a party to the suit, this puts
the plaintiff in the unenviable position of having to defend the absent
third party while simultaneously trying to persuade the factfinder of the
defendant's liability.239
The use of superseding cause may even result in an injured plaintiff
remaining uncompensated. If the factfmder determines that the secondin-time tortfeasor's act is superseding and that tortfeasor is judgment

233. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
234. Although this Comment is limited to admiralty, this argument is not similarly limited and
applies equally well to torts occurring on land.
235. Phillips, supra note 189, at 7 ("[I]t should be sufficient for the jury to simply say that the
defendant's act or omission was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and leave it at
that.").
236. Id. at 2 ("There is simply no need to decide any issue other than whether the plaintiff's
damages were a natural and probable result of this defendant's breach of duty.").
237. Id. at 8.
238. Restatement, supra note 99, at §§ 440-43 (indicating that intervening act may be that of

third party).
239. Phillips, supranote 189, at 8.
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proof, the plaintiff will be unable to recover. If the court analyzed the
case without superseding cause, the plaintiff could recover from the first
actor in those jurisdictions that impose joint and several liability on joint
tortfeasors. In this scenario, the doctrine fails to meet the essential goal
of proximate cause: limiting the defendant's liability without
undercutting tort law. Although it succeeds in limiting the defendant's
liability, it undermines tort law's purpose of compensating the victim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Reliable Transfer Court correctly replaced the outmoded divided
damages rule with pure comparative fault in admiralty collision cases. In
doing so, it appropriately overruled the major-minor fault rule, which
excused a party's fault merely because it was slight. In Sofec, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of superseding cause doctrine in
conjunction with the pure comparative fault system. However, the Sofec
Court did not fully consider the different methods of determining
whether a cause is superseding. This failure enabled the Court to confuse
the methods and ultimately rely on the one that conflicts with pure
comparative fault.
Courts should abandon superseding cause analysis in admiralty. The
foreseeability and remoteness methods of analyzing superseding cause
focus on traditional notions of proximate cause, which do not conflict
with pure comparative fault. Although legally sound, they add nothing
but confusion to proximate cause analysis and should be abandoned. The
culpability method, on the other hand, is based on degree of fault rather
than proximate cause concepts. It directly conflicts with pure
comparative fault, which requires that fault be shared among all faulty
parties regardless of how significant or slight their negligent conduct.
Furthermore, the Court's validation of the culpability method of
analyzing superseding cause is inconsistent with its previous rejection of
the major-minor fault rule. Abandoning superseding cause in admiralty
law would clear the murky waters of proximate cause and allow
comparative fault to sail forth unhindered.
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